THE NATIONAL
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FOR REFORM, JUSTICE &
FAIRNESS IN
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THE ARTICLE BELOW LIKE DR PELLING IS QUITE LONG
IT MAKES VERY INTERESTING READING.
THE
DIVORCE LEGISLATION OF 1971 – 1996. RETROSPECT AND
PROSPECT.
The article has 40 sections so if you would prefer to
browse then make a choice by clicking
Article Sections below.
Alternatively make a selection
by clicking the question mark to obtain full section titles.
Introduction.
As a divorce practitioner with many years experience I find that
most clients come to me in a state of total bewilderment and
astonishment over what happens to them in divorce
proceedings.
Injustice in Secret Courts.
What
astonishes them is the perceived injustice, the abandonment
of any generally recognised principles of justice and
morality, and the hostility to men, which characterise the
divorce courts. The bewilderment results from a widespread
lack of public understanding –
until themselves involved
– of
the way in which the Divorce Courts (not the weasel words
“Family Courts” for courts which break up families) have,
over the past 25 years, deviated from the laws as Parliament
intended and expected them to be applied, and from the
generally held views of men and women as to justice and fair
play.
This bewilderment is found whatever the degree of education
of the client. Its prime cause is the conspiracy of silence
in which only a distorted and limited picture emerges from
the closed doors behind which matrimonial cases are heard in
secret courts such as have not been seen in Britain since the
days of the Star Chamber. Behind closed doors, and with
closed eyes and ears, the legal and social work professions
operate in an “invented world”, where it is assumed that
their actions are fair and just, and will be so regarded and
approved of by right-minded people, and the general public.
It also results from the approach of the media, who tend to
accept without question the smooth and misleading picture put
to them by the lawyers and social workers and, with a few
honourable exceptions tend to suppress any alternative view.
The deviation
from justice.
This
deviation from justice began with the 1969 Divorce Reform Act
and the 1970 Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act. For a
number of years pressures had built up from various
influential quarters for what was decribed as “reform” of
the divorce laws. The public and Parliament were sold the
idea that there were many people who could not obtain
divorces, although they had lived apart for many years, who
ought to be free to do so, and many others who wanted a
divorce without the need to allege a matrimonial offence
against the other. This seemed on the face of it, just, which
was why there was so little opposition to proposals for
change. The Church of England further muddied the waters by
its call for easier divorce but with an inquest into the
causes of each marital breakdown. The divorce activists,
working to a hidden agenda, used the Church to gain its
support, but made sure it got something very different from
what it hoped for.

The
activists for “reform”.
Among those, most actively pushing for changes in the divorce
laws, principally the divorce lawyers and senior judges, and
the upper intellectual and professional classes, there were a
range of motives but, among the lawyers particularly, a
hidden agenda. The intellectual and professional class, as in
many other fields, suffered from the bizarre belief that, if
the machinery of conflict were removed or minimised, people
would resolve their differences in a civilised manner. Taine
(1) wrote in the 19th
Century, that the principal cause of the French Revolution
had been that the governing classes were moved, above all
things, by an extreme horror of conflict and violence, and
preferred the lives of maniacs, and malefactors to the
maintenance of order. Corelli Barnett (2) wrote a few years
ago that the educated classes of Britain not only thought the
world ought to be a place where civilised people settled
their differences over tea in the drawing room, a noble
ideal, but really thought it was such a place, an
extraordinary delusion. They believed and still profess to
believe, that if the causes of divorce and the parties
behaviour were excluded from discussion, conflict and
bitterness would cease. They entirely failed to realise that
people in marital conflict are fighting over the most
important matters in their lives, their children, and all
they have worked for, and that such fundamental issues can
usually only be resolved by conflict. They also failed to
realise that there is no greater bitterness than that caused
by injustice. In a word, they thought that weapons cause war,
not that war causes weapons, and failed to understand that
most people of any spirit prefer conflict to submitting to
injustice.
(1) Taine, The French
Revolution. (2) Barnett, C.
Decline of British power.

The
naivete
of the educated classes.
On the whole the educated classes, except where they
themselves have been involved in divorce, still naively
believe they have a civilised divorce law, and the serious
press is constantly full of letters from well-meaning people
who say that those in divorce need sympathy and help in “fairly
distributing their property and helping the children”. They
fail to realise that for the bulk of the population there is
not enough property to distribute, fairly or otherwise, and
that all, whether rich or poor, regard their property as
theirs and not something to be taken from them or, as one
eminent judge described it, “redistributed within the
family”. A woman solicitor even wrote to the legal press
saying we should develop a system in which all Court Orders
were Consent Orders!. This is the fear of conflict of which
Taine wrote. In the real world, however, two nations who
wanted the same piece of land fought for it, and in the
domestic sphere two people who wanted the same house or
custody of the same children also do. This is blindingly
obvious to all but the “civilised” classes. People in the
real world continue to believe that it is “their” child
and “their” house, and will not accept that the Olympian
disposal of their child and house to someone else is somehow
“fair”, and thus to be meekly accepted with a pat on the
back from the social workers. In the “invented world” of
the lawyers and social workers, however, the holding of such
views is seen as mad or bad or both, and is guaranteed to
incur hostility. I have even heard one woman lawyer say how
much she admired the “moderation and reasonableness” of
men who voluntarily gave up all contact with their children
because their wife objected to it. What I suspect underlies
the desire of the lawyers, the social workers and the “well
meaning” classes to avoid conflict in divorce is the
delusion that their anti-male attitudes are shared by the
general public and that, if the machinery of conflict were
somehow removed, everybody would happily accept the diktats
of the divorce courts.

The
lawyers and
"social scientists"
Behind the scenes were other forces, most strongly represented in
the legal and social science professions, who had a fanatical belief in feminism in the
widest sense. They wanted a system in which women had no
obligations or duties in marriage, but unqualified rights
regardless of conduct. I well remember being told by a lady
barrister in a well known divorce chambers that most of the
men in her chambers, Eton and Oxford types, considered that
any woman who married, however briefly, should be entitled to
be kept in comfort for the rest of her life without working,
regardless of her conduct. The rise of this element, always
strong among the lawyers, was compounded by the growth
since the war, as a result of widespread university
education, of a large arts graduate intelligentsia, whose
views on social and moral issues had come to depart radically
from those held by the general public.
The
debate in Parliament.
All those various elements made their big effort in the House
of Commons Committee stage of the 1970 Act when they
attempted to have conduct deleted as an issue in maintenance
and capital orders. Until then the law had been clear for
generations, adultery, desertion, and cruelty were a bar to
any claim for maintenance and therefore a heavy deterrent to
breaking up a marriage. If a woman was “bored” with her
marriage or “fancied” somebody else, or needed “space”,
she had to make a value judgement before breaking up her
marriage. Was it so unacceptable that she was prepared to
forgo the financial benefits?. The Committee threw this out
with great firmness, and a reading of the records of the
Committee in the House of Commons is a salutary exercise. The
Committee thought it outrageous that conduct should be
irrelevant, and pointed out that such a move would only lead
to widespread divorce and injustice.
One other move by the “reformers”
as I shall now call them, was also defeated, although
actually introduced by the government – a statutory
requirement for the courts to seek by financial orders, to
maintain the financial position of the wife only, but not
that of the husband. The “reformers” had been defeated.
But this was short-lived.

The
1970 - 1973 legislation.
The
1970 Divorce Act preserved conduct, and the only significant
change in that respect was that cruelty as a ground for
divorce was replaced by unreasonable behaviour, the
difference being that the element of injury to health was no
longer required. There was no suggestion in Parliament that
the test of acceptable behaviour should change.
Further
legislation followed in the form of the Matrimonial Causes
Act 1973 that was, in many ways, a consolidating Act for the
1970 Act, and the associated legislation that had taken place
immediately before and after it. These Acts had answered the
pressures of the “reformers” by adding two additional
grounds to the existing three grounds for divorce. The
existing three had been adultery, cruelty (i.e. behaviour
plus injury to health) and desertion, and the two additional
grounds were two years’ separation in the case of consent
by both parties to divorce, and five years’ separation if
one party did not consent. The two years’ separation plus
consent ground catered for the more sensitive elements of the
educated classes who, in the case of genuine mutual consent,
were repelled by divorce petitions containing allegations
against the other party and wanted to do everything by “consent”.
The five years separation ground catered for those caught in
the position where they could never obtain a divorce for lack
of grounds. It was quite apparent that Parliament
contemplated, in this, three classes of divorce; a compulsory
divorce after five years’ separation, a consensual divorce
after two years’ separation in which people could make
their own arrangements, and a non-consensual divorce in the
case of adultery, unreasonable behaviour (i.e. cruelty
without the need to prove injury to health) or desertion
where one party did not want a divorce. It was naively
anticipated that most divorces would be by consent. This
never proved to be the case.
The financial provisions
rested, as to the criteria for making orders, on a more
detailed reiteration of the provisions, based on conduct,
which had been in the original 1857 Divorce Act. The courts
had to make such order as was just “having regard to the
parties conduct”.
Parliament's
intentions frustrated.
The excesses of the reformers
had apparently been frustrated by Parliament, but the Courts
proceeded immediately to undermine Parliament’s intentions
in a devastating manner. First, they ruled that the test of
unreasonable behaviour was subjective as opposed to
objective, so that conduct which an ordinary person would
find insufficiently unreasonable to justify divorce was
nevertheless to be held sufficient if the petitioner claimed
to find it so (3). This opened the gates to the ridiculously
weak “behaviour” petitions of the past 20 years, and led
to a widespread practice of anybody (particularly a man) who
sought to defend a weak “behaviour” petition being
subjected to hostile assault by judges. In addition, such
litigants received extreme pressure from their own barristers
and solicitors, who would tell them that
there was no purpose in defending, since the marriage had
broken down. Legal aid was usually refused although sometimes
granted to women. The Courts themselves, in defiance of
Parliament, had brought about the “divorce on demand”
which most of the lawyers and academics favoured.
(3) i.e., the subjective test
The
removal of conduct.
The
second and fatal step was for the Family Division, in the case
of Wachtel (4) to hold that conduct was usually irrelevant in
the case of financial matters. This was only partially stalled
by the Court of Appeal which ruled that conduct was relevant if
it was "gross and obvious". Soon afterwards, the Court
of Appeal, differently constituted, held in the case of Rogers
(5) that the Wachtel decision was plainly wrong and contrary to
the expressed intention of Parliament. This decision, although
it appeared in the law reports, was virtually kept out of the
legal press, and most lawyers are unaware of it. Wachtel was
followed by the courts, and not Rogers, although each were of
equal authority. This was a period in which the legal press
tended to give great publicity to the views of those who
supported the anti-conduct trends, and to ignore the views of
those who opposed them. We now know from the recent memoirs of a
Judge that this decision resulted from a private meeting of the
Judges who decided this policy approach in secret, over twenty
years ago. The revelation has received little publicity beyond
an admiring comment in The Times, which seemed to fail to
realise what it was saying. In practice it became rare for the
courts to find anything "gross or obvious" or on the
fairly rare occasions when it did, to do anything about it.
Judicial hostility to raising conduct, at least against wives,
became the norm. Finally the Courts abandoned the age old rule
that a deserting wife was not entitled to maintenance.
The Courts were required under
Section 25 of The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973 to put the
parties in the same position as prior to the divorce "so
far as possible having regard to their conduct", and in
doing so to consider a number of factors including that of
"need". However, despite Parliament having thrown out
the reformer's attempts to have "need" apply
specifically to wives only, "need" became the only
consideration that the Courts took seriously. "Need"
was interpreted as meaning giving the wife absolute security to
the extent that this could be squeezed out of the husband.
Whereas, the widow of a Falklands war hero was left to a meagre
pension, the adulterous wife was showered with sympathy and held
to be entitled to the utmost security for the rest of her life.
As shown in Wachtel, the orders of the court were made "without
having regard to their conduct", in direct contravention of
the Act. The Courts ignored all other statutorily required
considerations that involved merit as distinct from need,
and in so doing ignored all considerations of justice,
"need" being the only consideration that involves no
"merit". A common approach was to give the wife (and
her boyfriend) the house on the grounds that they
"needed" it to bring up the husband's children. In
contrast the husband without wife or children was then told that
a bedsitter met his needs.
(4)
Wachtel v Wachtel, 1973
(5)
Rogers v Rogers, 1973
The
"weak" behaviour petition.
The net effect of these developments was to create a pattern in
which spouses, mainly wives, brought weak behaviour petitions
when they became bored with their husbands or found somebody
else. Husbands were pressured not to defend themselves and found
they were stripped of their assets and children by hostile
Courts applying a quasi-Marxist interpretation of
"need" and a Court of Appeal determined to decide any
question in favour of the wife if it possibly could, under the
leadership of the same judge who had decided the Wachtel case
before it went to appeal.
The
ousting of husbands from the home.
The
"reformers" had thus succeeded in fooling
Parliament into passing legislation and then using that
legislation to achieve the very opposite of what Parliament had
intended, without the public ever being aware until it hit them,
and usually not even then. The situation was reinforced and
worsened by the domestic violence legislation, coupled with an
extremely wide interpretation of its provisions. The Courts made
use of a claimed inherent jurisdiction to oust husbands at the
slightest pretext, the commonest one being that the wife
suffered distress from the presence of the husband. It became
the practice of the Courts, having pressured the husband into
not defending the divorce petition, to say that, since the wife
petitioner was going to get the children anyway, the husband
would have to go sooner or later, so he might as well go
immediately. In practice, even this became unnecessary, since it
became common practice for the husband to arrive at court to
find his own barrister pressing him to leave. Those lawyers,
like myself, who came along and announced that the husband was
not leaving, found themselves the subject of the most indignant
and outraged pressure from courts and wives's lawyers alike.

The
Courts held to be acting without lawful authority.
Significantly, in 1984, in the case of Richards (6), the House
of Lords held
that the Courts had wrongly assumed an inherent jurisdiction
and had been issuing ouster orders for many years without, in
many cases, any lawful authority whatsover. Ouster became
much less frequent after that with considerable restrictions
placed on it by the Courts. The bulk of ouster cases I
encountered for some years were ones where the pressure came
not from the Court, but from the husband's own lawyers. The
situation has gradually returned to the pre-Richards position
and the 1996 Act, with its absence of references to justice,
is highly likely to worsen the position, as most judges are
eager to restore the Richards position of ouster on wife's
demand. Indeed, the recent case of the Portsmouth headmaster
ousted from his home, is likely to be the precursor of many
more.
(6) Richards v Richards, 1984
Public
bewilderment.
All
of these developments took place without being realised or
understood outside the ranks of those involved in divorce,
and it was widely assumed that divorce was as it had been but
merely easier to obtain. Those involved in divorce did not
really realise what had hit them until it did. Many could not
believe what had happened to them, let alone understand it.

Bizarre
process of reasoning.
In
order to justify their approach, bizarre processes of
reasoning were adopted by the Court, which an eminent student
of these developments, Dr John Campion, has, as part of the
wider picture, summarised in the phrase "the invented
world". By this he means a world in which the weird
views of the "family" lawyers and social workers
were regarded as the only normal approach to human relations,
so that anyone who objected to being stripped of their home,
property and children, in a way they would not be if they had
committed a grave crime, was assumed to be mad or bad. It was
a world in which it was normal, right and proper that men who
had committed no crime would be stripped of everything, in
which the Courts refused to enforce their own orders against
wives if they chose not to obey them, in which it was
"in the best interest of the family" for children
to be deprived of their fathers, and to see their fathers,
stripped and humiliated, and in which husbands/fathers
were not only expected to work to support or at least house
their former spouses living with their children and a new
lover, but actually regarded as mad or bad if they raised any
objection. There was no hesitation about throwing them into
prison if they did not comply with the Court's order. It was
a world in which several very senior judges proclaimed that
there was no significance in the "blood tie"
between father and child, but only in that between mother and
child.
Bogus
principles of social behaviour.
A
number of quite extraordinary principles of social behaviour
were put forward by the courts to justify their reasoning, in
response to the sense of moral outrage that began to develop
among the public. A bizarre view was put forward by the
judges that the husband was the "cock out feathering his
nest while his wife was sitting at home on the nest",
and that the husband could not have feathered his nest were
the wife not sitting on it. This has been uncritically
repeated throughout the legal profession and the law reports,
although even momentary examination reveals it to be
manifestly absurd. The man who has regularly worked would, in
most cases, have acquired his property, whether married or
not. A possible exception is in the case of the man pushed on
by an ambitious wife, but then for every man pushed on
by an ambitious wife there is likely to be one held back by
an unambitious one. Indeed, it should further be pointed out
that the wives who have acquired houses and property would,
had they not married, have been unlikely to acquire such
property, or even own any property, because of the lower pay
of women.
Injustice
better than conflict.
It
was argued that by stripping husbands of their property
without investigating the causes of the marital breakdown,
Courts were sparing the parties the distress of conflict and
the bitterness which would have resulted from that conflict.
If the victim protested, or expressed bitterness at being
"stripped" or pointed out that it was being
"stripped" rather than conflict to which he
objected, judges regarded and treated him as mad or bad. The
lawyers would patronisingly boast that they had spared the
husband the distress of a Court battle by stripping him at
the courtroom door.
Wilful
confusion of reasoning.
It
was said that relationships broke down for complex reasons,
and that the Courts could not investigate these reasons in
depth. Often true, but irrelevant. What should matter, and to
the ordinary member of the public did matter, was who
broke up the marriage and whether they had objectively
substantial reasons, not what the feelings were in a
relationship. If this were not so then, in the eyes of the
Courts, marriage as an institution is of less importance than
relationships, including cohabitation. It is a contract of
marriage, and its breach, not a relationship, upon which
Parliament intended the courts to adjudicate.
The
underlying prejudice against men.
The
reality was that the Courts did not wish to investigate the
facts, mainly because investigation might reveal matters
adverse to the wife, and partly from an Olympian distaste for
conflict. The same factors were involved in the reluctance of
the Courts to hear the views of children as to where they
wished to reside. They might hear what they did not want to
hear, children saying that they wished to live with their
father. Again, it was said that it was best for the children
to se a difficult marriage broken up, and the wife in a
secure accomodation, preferably with her new "man"
to form a new "family". Why the children should
benefit from losing a father, seeing him impoverished,
probably losing contact with him, and a decline in their
living standards, was not explained. It was only explicable
on the ground that the judiciary and the bulk of the legal
and social work professions saw fathers as figures of no
significance . Indeed there were many judges, and many more
lawyers, quite prepared to say that they were not in the
least concerned with what happened to the husband/father and
often that the "blood tie" between father and child
was of no significance. The Courts wholeheartedly embraced
this view, ruling that, when the parents divorced, there was
a new family, consisting of the wife, children and the new
man., The old family, i.e., the husband, had ceased to exist,
except for maintenance, where the courts did not hesitate to
say that the husband ought to be "supporting his
family", even if not allowed to see the same family of
which the same courts regarded him as no longer part.
New
principles to justify prejudice.
The
Courts justified their prejudice by developing principles ad
hoc, whenever they were necessary to place the wife in a
favourable position. if the property was in joint names it
was said that the wife was entitled to her half, regardless
of the merits and issues, because her name was on the deeds,
in accordance with the law relating to land, whereas the
husband was stripped of his half share, despite his name
being on the deeds, on the grounds of the wife's
"needs". The "principle" which caused the
greatest outrage was that adultery by wives could not be
criticised because "it took three to commit
adultery" - yet another absurd generality without
foundation which significantly, applied only in favour of
wives. I remember being in the Court of Appeal, in a case in
which a most senior judge, then a household name, who had
repeatedly said that wives' adultery was of no consequence,
remarked "Your client [a man] has committed
adultery". My client's woman Counsel replied
"Conduct is not in issue", whereupon the Judge
replied "I am not saying conduct is in issue. I merely
remarked that your client has committed adultery". My
client then found himself going downhill, castigated for
adultery, with remarkable speed!!. Public outrage over these
attitudes became so widespread that a Lord Chancellor, in the
face of this public outrage over the exclusion of conduct,
started to talk about punishing adulterous husbands, while
making no apparent mention of punishing adulterous wives at
all.
New
judges - increased prejudice.
These
views persisted and intensified and the practices which
resulted became the subject of a rather sick joke in the
1970's; men committed more crime than women because the man
who wanted £50,000 had to hold up a bank, whereas the woman
had only to take a man with £50,000 to the Register Office.
Not
only did those views persist but the new breed of liberal
judges upheld them much more vigorously. The occasional
maverick, brought up in a non "family law"
background or in an older tradition of justice, is dying out.
We now have judges who have carried on most of their
career in the post 1970 environment. They know nothing
different, their attitudes generally are such that it would
not occur to them to challenge the injustices which they
daily administer, let alone to see them as injustices, and
they are further inhibited both by the general tendency of
English lawyers to conform and by the national tendency not
to think too hard. an illustration of the attitudes of the
Bar, from which most judges are drawn, was contained in a
recent article in a law journal., where comment was made that
it was useful that solicitors could appear in the new Patent
County Court as barristers appeared to have
"problems" about cross examining female witnesses!.
Judges
provide incentive to divorce.
Applied
to everyday situations all this meant that the law as
Parliament intended it pre-1974 had gone. Prior to then, a
wife who deserted her husband was disentitled to maintenance
at common law, and could be divorced without maintenance
after 3 years, and an adulterous or cruel wife was divorced
usually without maintenance. In none of these cases did she
have a capital claim against any property not hers in law.
Until not many years before there had been no
maintenance for the children if with a mother in a state of
desertion. This was a powerful deterrent to desertion. Those
who planned to ditch their husband without good cause
had to make a value judgement. If they went off with the
boyfriend they received no maintenance and no capital. In the
new situation the judges said "if you want to ditch your
husband and take a boyfriend we will support you and see that
you do not lose out. You can have your husband's money and
your boyfriend" they then proceeded to express surpise
and even puzzlement at the huge rise in the divorce rates, to
become the highest in Europe, without, in the faintest degree
seeing that they were the cause. Those that did understand it
seemed not concerned. If easy divorce without consequences
was what women wanted, women should have it.
The
corrupting effect of injustice on the
lawyers.
The
development of judicial attitudes was accompanied by a
corresponding corrupting effect on the legal profession.
Judge who cease to do justice according to law, themselves
come to be indifferent to legal principles, and ordinary
principles of justice. Lawyers become similarly infected. The
basis of all professional relationships is a duty to the
client, the duty in the case of a lawyer being to do his best
on behalf of a client, impartially to advise the client, and
then to put the client's case and wishes to the best of his
ability, subject to the general limits of professional
conduct keeping within the law.
It
soon became obvious that many divorce lawyers (who began
hypocritically to call themselves "family lawyers")
were not acting in the interests of male clients. Attitudes
to male clients often ranged from the openly hostile though
the plausible sell out approach to hopeless defeatism. The
quality of advice was frequently poor, helpful case law
frequently ignored, and serious attempts to resist or answer
claims not frequently made. A general attitude developed of
"find out what she'll take and give it to her". So
accustomed were wives' lawyers to meeting no resistance
that I found that, if resisted, they either treated the
resistance as some type of joke or pretence to impress
the client, or exploded with indignation. One significant
consequence of this was that fewer and fewer lawyers did
divorce work. The quality of divorce practitioners markedly
deteriorated.
The
effect on the clients.
The
hostility of the judges, reinforced by the unwillingness of
lawyers to stand up to judges, and the prejudices and
failings of the lawyers, led to clients frequently not being
advised of their rights or their case not being pressed in
the Courts. What also happened was that Courts often made
orders quite beyond their powers if they felt they could get
away with it, that is to say, if they felt the lawyers in
front of them would do little about it, as was usually the
case. Such attitudes spread throughout the profession to such
an extent that some firms in London boasted that "We
only act for wives". Solicitors at Law Society
conferences called for lawyers to cease to be obliged to act
in thei clients' interest but, in a new and ominous phrase
"to act in the interests of the family". This was a
code word for acting in the interests of the wife, and has
become general usage among "family Lawyers". It
became common practice, particularly among barristers, for
them to get together and "settle" the case usually
to the husband's disadvantage. The process of indoctrination
began at an early stage. Exam papers with a dozen questions
on Family Law contained as many as eleven saying
"!advise the wife". The tendency of the
Englishman not to think had enabled a small and highly
motivated minority to brainwash a profession into
unthinking acceptance of its views.
The
so-called "interests of the family".
The
absurdity of the expression "acting in the interests of
the family" is shown when one actually examines it. The
only person in Court who is there to act in the interests of
the family is the Judge. His function is to do justice
between the parties. This is something which they now proudly
boast of not doing, saying their function is to protect the
wife and children, not to do justice. The "family"
clearly does not include the father. The function of
the lawyers is to put forward the interests of their client,
not the interests of the so-called "family," the
other principal member of which in any event will have
another lawyer. Indeed, the matter goes beyond that since, if
the lawyers "act in the interests of the family" as
they think they are doing, all they are doing is acting in
what they think are the interests of the family. They may be
wrong and thus do damage to the family. The ultimate line
became "putting the child first" which really meant
putting the mother first, and this has become the
all-embracing excuse for all manners of injustice. Indeed,
putting the child first appears to have been the basis of the
recently reported case on in Re B, (Times Law Reports, 9th
July 1997) in which a father was barred from seeing his child
after the step father threatened to leave the mother if
contact were granted. This seems a questionable view if the
child's interests, since continued contact with its father
would seem of more importance than any short term distress of
the mother caused by departure of the step father. Indeed
this view appears to regard fatherhood as of no great
importance.
Public
outrage.
Increasing
public outrage led, by 1979, to the formation of
organisations such as Campaign for Justice in Divorce.
Vigorous bombardment of the Press and Parliament began to
lead to awareness of something being wrong, even though the
precise nature of it was not understood. The casualties of the
matrimonial battlefield appeared in social gatherings like
disabled men after the First World War. In 1982 three hundred
and fifteen MPs signed a motion to investigate the position.
The pressure for change became so intense that the legal
establishment decided that something had to be done. What
happened, though was that they effectively seized control of
the legislation and through skilful selection of the
Committee, and rigorous control of the voting in Parliament,
ensured that Parliament never really understood what was
being complained about and, what went through was relatively
innocuous. The establishment skilfully "conned"
Parliament and was disastrously helped by many of the leaders
of the men's organisations, who went along with what was
happening, apparently jollied along by the civil servants
involved.
Failure
of the first men's organisations - the conduct issue.
In
my view it was an unfortunate feature of those attempting to
end the abuses that they failed to accept that, in order to
get public opinion going with them, they would have to accept
that middle aged and elderly ladies could not be seen to be
left for young women and not provided for. This was a major
cause of the failure of the husbands' groups to achieve wider
support. Because the husbands' groups failed to push the
"conduct" issue, which was the cause of most
outrage among ordinary people, and campaigned instead for the
total ending of all maintenance, they alienated a large body
of public opinion which would not support this. I cannot
over-emphasise that conduct is the key to everything because
conduct is the issue that outrages ordinary people, and it is
the abolition of conduct, together with the various invented
"principles of social behaviour",which has made
divorce so easy and tempting to wives. In essence, wives have
been told by the Courts that it is right and proper to say
"I don't want him but I want his money".
What
is conduct.
What
do I mean by "conduct"?. The Courts will tell you
that they not the time to go into nit-picking issues of
conduct and that, in any case, usually one person is as bad
as another. The lack of time is a quite extraordinary
argument , because the implication is that the Courts are far
too busy doing injustice on a production line scale to have
the time to do justice on an individual scale. But,
importantly, conduct does involve nit-picking issues. To most
people, conduct means adultery, extreme violence and
desertion and similar matters. Neither men nor women see why
the adulterous or deserting wife receives maintenance or is
allowed to strip the husband of his assets. More subtly,
though, the real issue relating to conduct is who brought an
end to the marriage itself and for what reason. Thus, if a
wife breaks up a marriage for no good reason, there is no
reason why she should receive maintenance other than her
capital contribution to her marriage. It is quite wrong that
a wife should be free to say she does not like her husband
yet still wishes to have his money. The current approach to
conduct is to exclude it in nearly all cases, unless it is
the man's conduct. One other approach has been to limit
conduct to the consequences of financial misconduct e.g.,
dissipation of assets, and then to top up the award so as to
cancel the effect of that conduct. This, at least on paper,
has been limited by the 1996 Act provisions which make clear
that conduct is not limited to financial misconduct. In
practice the courts are likely to ignore Parliament's
intentions, and lawyers will continue to reject conduct as an
issue.
The
first men's organisations collapse.
The
failure of the men's organisations to achieve anything in the
1984 legislation, reinforced by their leaders' support for
this useless legislation, led to a decline in their
membership for some years, exemplifying the tendency of men's
organisations the world over to split and even to litigate
between themselves.
The
revival.
By
the 1990's the men's organisations were beginning to revive
under new leadership. The new organisations, of which the
United Kingdom Men's Movement was the most significant, had a
better grasp of what had happened in the past, and had more
defined policies on how to deal with the problem. They
understood the conduct issue more clearly. I had written the
original version of this paper in 1988 to create an
understanding, precisely because I had watched the men's
organisations, for many of whom I had acted, floundering in
the dark, railing against the system without understanding
its causes. I concluded that I needed to update it to meet
the challenge of the 1990's.
The
prospect of change.
So
powerful however, had become the weight of the establishment
thinking in this field combined with a lack of public and
Parliamentary understanding of its cause - the lawyers - that
the prospect of change in the foreseeable future seemed low.
Change
began to come from unexpected sources.
The
first was the increasing concern generally and in the
academic field about the breakdown of the family in this
country, and the second was the Government's desire to save
money on Legal Aid.
Social
breakdown led to the increasing publication of articles on
the breakdown of the family and the injustices in the Courts
by outstanding writers such as Martin Mears in the Sunday
Telegraph, and other writers in the Daily Mail. Only Martin
Mears, however, grasped the importance of the conduct issue
and that the attitude of the Courts and lawyers was the cause
of the breakdown of the family. The others tended to see the
cause as moral decline and the remedy as education in
marriage and the seeking of reconciliation in mediation. They
failed to realise that if you tell people that they can dump
their spouses, and still take their money, all the social
workers in the world will not hold them back.
It
might have taken many more years for these truths to sink in,
and the pressure to do something to develop, but for the
Government's desire to save money.
Here
two factors came together, the Government wanted to
save money, and the family lawyers, and apparently the
lawyers who advised the Government, wanted to realise
their dream - divorce on demand. This led to the 1996 Family
Law Act put forward by the Lord Chancellor.
The
Government's proposals.
The
Lord Chancellor's proposals, in effect, were for divorce on
demand, mediators to solve the financial issues and save
Legal Aid money, and a widened power of ouster which was to
extend to cohabitees, thus reducing marriage to mere
cohabitation. Upon all the evidence, much of the Cabinet did
understand what was happening, and certainly did not want it,
but a small and powerful element did, and forced it through
the Cabinet.
Parliament's
reaction.
When
Parliament, concerned by social breakdown, considered the
legislation, it, as a result of an outstanding campaign by
pro family campaigners, indicated that it was beginning to
understand a little of what had been happening. All honours
are due to the Daily Mail in particular for the way it
mobilised opposition so that a strong opposition developed
and the situation reached the point where the legislation was
threatened with failure. A desperate Government made many
concessions which for the first time may drive the beginnings
of a wedge into the present system. Despite us now having
divorce on demand, conduct is supposed to be taken into
account to a greater degree in financial and child issues. It
is my belief that the Courts will continue to defy
Parliament's intention. I remember hearing a barrister, now a
High Court Judge, claim at a lecture on the 1984 Act
that they would ignore it. Nevertheless the continued social
breakdown and the further flagrant defiance by the Courts, of
which a wider public understanding is developing, will
continue to arouse further Parliamentary and media concern.
The
Child Support Act.
Another
factor which had contributed to social breakdown was the
Child Support Act, sold to Parliament as a means of saving
the Exchequer from the cost of so-called "dead beat
dads" who were not supporting their families, in
particular, the unmarried fathers.
It
was later admitted by the Child Support Agency chief that the
real target, however, was the middle class married father
with means. In other words, once again there as a hidden
agenda.
The
whole concept was fundamentally flawed from the beginning.
The burden of the Child Support Agency's exactions was so
heavy that, for 95% of fathers, it would mean working at
subsistence level. If it be subsistence level they might as
well give up work anyway. Indeed, if they did carry on
working, they would not be left with sufficient means
themselves to found a family. Thus a further under-class
would be created of impoverished men who could not afford to
support a family, and of women who, in consequence, could not
find a husband with whom to form a family. The obviousness of
this seemed entirely to elude the Government in so far as it
was concerned about it at all. In reality, despite the
expenditure of nearly two billion pounds, the new Agency has
recovered far less than the DSS did under the old liable
relatives system, and the position is worsening. Two thirds
of all persons who receive a Child Support Agency Assessment
give up their employment within six months. Every form of
falsification of figures disguises the non-recovery and
arrears continue to rocket by hundred of millions every year.
The cost in Social Security for the men who have given up
work is phenomenal. By depriving men of the family, the
incentive to work, the system was accelerating the move to
the matriarchal society that now dominates the American inner
cities and many of our industrial areas - a world of
unemployed single fathers and of fatherless children running
wild. Feminists boast that stone age societies were
matrilineal - that is why they remained primitive.
The
pension issue.
One
other development in recent years has been the successive
Acts of Parliament, first providing for maintenance out of
pension provision, and then (1996 Act) providing for the
pension to be treated as an asset and divided, so that a wife
who has remarried will many years later be collecting a chunk
of her ex husband's pension.
There
is a false logic in the whole pension issue. Pensions are
being treated as a capital asset when they are not. a pension
is a contingent income dependent on many factors. Splitting
it could lead to the absurd and unjust situation where, on
retirement, the ex husband has a proportion of his pension
and his ex wife, by now married to somebody else, has the
rest of his pension as well as her own and her new husband's.
Previously, the principle had been that pensions are really
only relevant if maintenance liability continued beyond
retirement age.
Once
again the so called "reformers" had pushed through
Parliament a provision the implications of which were not
understood by MP's. Another encouragement to easy divorce had
been created.
The
solution.
II
wrote in 1988, and still hold, that the logical consequence
of any situation which sought justice was that there should
be three classes of divorce. The first would be where the
parties reach agreement both to have a divorce and on
financial and related matters. The second would be where one
party only wanted a divorce for a good and substantial
reason, such as grave misconduct by the other party, e.g.,
adultery, desertion, or serious (in the pre 1970 sense)
behaviour, objectively assessed as justifying termination of
the marriage. The third, and perhaps the great majority of
cases, would be where one party only wants a divorce and
could not show such misconduct by the other party. In the
first case, no dispute would arise. In the second, the
payment of maintenance to the innocent party would be
appropriate in some cases, particularly where the petitioner
was a middle aged or elderly lady. In the third case the
party wanting the divorce should effectively be put to their
election. Either they continue with the marriage and its
obligations or they repudiate the marriage and its
obligations and thereby forego the right to receive any
financial benefit from the marriage which they had
unjustifiably broken up. "I do not want him, but I want
his money" is a morally unacceptable position (even
prostitutes provide services for their reward) and one which
has led to Europe's highest divorce rate.
I
have no doubt that if this approach were adopted there would
be a radical reduction in the number of divorces. The
"principle" invented by the Courts, that both
parties are at fault in the termination of a marriage,
results from a mixture of blind prejudice and deliberate
intellectual muddle, and has led to Courts' effectively
defining marriage as a state in which the wife should have no
obligations of any kind yet should have financial rights far
greater than those of a widow, regardless of her terminating
the marriage for no good reason. The justifiability of the
termination of the marriage should be the key issue. There is
no reason why someone should expect to break a contract and
still benefit from it.
The
future.
It
is clear from the content of the debates in Parliament that a
substantial number of MP's are beginning to understand what
has happened. The change of Government and the influx into
Parliament of a mass of feminists and pro-feminists strongly
suggest, however, that only slow progress will be made in
this Parliament.
However
the first floodgate likely to collapse is the Child Support
Agency, Its ever increasing cost, and decreasing recovery
rate, plus the reported billion plus bill to replace its
computers, will make it increasingly insupportable. It is
also likely that litigation over pensions will greatly
increase the volume and bitterness of litigants in the
courts, and bring home the scale of the disaster to more
members of the public.
Getting
the truth to MP's.
The
only way forward is to get home to MP's the message in this
article, which clearly sets out the true case of the divorce
disaster, the way the Courts have overridden the intentions
of Parliament, and the way in which the divorce lobby have
conned Parliament and the media.
Laws
to override judicial prejudice.
An
essential aspect of any ultimate reform must be to have laws
drafted in sufficient detail that the Courts, in their
decisions, are unable to fly in the face of the intentions of
Parliament. Courts who are
prepared to order a man to maintain a wife who is living with
somebody else and see nothing wrong with this (7), or to
maintain an ex-wife from a short, childless marriage who
cannot work because she has become pregnant by another man
subsequent to a divorce (8), cannot be entrusted with
wide discretions.
(7)
Atkinson
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